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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
The State of Idaho appeals from the district court's order suppressing 
evidence. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
The state charged Larry M. Robinson with possession of 
methamphetamine and harboring a wanted felon. (R., pp. 31-33.) The state also 
charged him with grand theft. (R., pp. 59-60. 1) Robinson moved to suppress "all 
evidence found at the residence." (R., p. 72.) 
Amber Prewitt is a probation officer and was supervising Greg Diagneau 
on misdemeanor probation. (Tr., p. 7, L. 11 - p. 8, L. 18; Prelim. Tr., p. 25, Ls. 3-
12.) Diagneau lived in Robinson's house. (Prelim. Tr., p. 77, Ls. 3-20.) As part 
of his probation Diagneau had signed a Fourth Amendment waiver which read: 
"During the term of my probation, I WAIVE my Fourth Amendment rights to 
Search and Seizure, based upon a reasonable request of any Probation Officer 
and/or Peace Officer. This includes the entire residence, vehicles, outbuildings 
and curtilages." (State's Exhibit 1, Terms and Conditions of Probation, p. 2, ,-r 12 
(in record at p. 100); see also R., p. 105; Tr., p. 21, L. 19 - p. 22, L. 7.) 
Diagneau had tested positive twice for the presence of controlled 
1 The cases were combined for purposes of suppression below (R., pp. 146-48) 
and have been joined for purposes of appeal (Order Consolidating Appeals (June 
10, 2011)). 
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substances and then stopped appearing for his scheduled urinalyses. (Tr., p. 9, 
Ls. 12-22.) Officer Prewitt wished to make contact with Diagneau to find out if he 
was in fact in compliance with probation and whether he had missed his 
appointments due to known transportation problems. (Tr., p. 9, L. 24 - p. 11, L. 
4.) She also wished to search his residence for controlled substances because 
she suspected he was not appearing for his appointments because he was using 
drugs. (Tr., p. 11, Ls. 5-17; Prelim. Tr., p. 27, Ls. 10-21.) 
Police officers accompanied Officer Prewitt on the probation search 
because they believed a wanted felon was hiding from police at the house where 
Diagneau and Robinson lived. (Tr., p. 10, Ls. 12-18; p. 11, L. 18 - p. 12, L. 2; 
Prelim. Tr., p. 7, L. 10 - p. 9 L. 8.) Police presence was usual because the 
probation officers do not carry guns and rely on the police for protection and 
security. (Tr., p. 13, L. 21 - p. 14, L. 8; Prelim. Tr., p. 26, L. 23 - p. 27, L. 9.) 
After being let in to the house by Diagneau's girlfriend, the police officers secured 
the residence before the probation officers entered. (Tr., p. 11, L. 18 - p. 12, L. 
1 O; p. 40, L. 19 - p. 41, L. 15.) Officer Prewitt made contact with the probationer, 
Diagneau. (Tr., p. 12, Ls. 10-12; Prelim. Tr., p. 30, Ls. 5-12.) She informed him 
at that time that they were present to conduct a search. (Prelim. Tr., p. 30, Ls. 5-
12; R., p. 107; see also Prelim. Tr., p. 39, Ls. 12-15 (Lieutenant Wardle also told 
Diagneau the reason the police and probation officers were there).) 
At about the time that officers entered they heard the master bedroom 
door close. (Tr., p. 29, Ls. 15-23; Prelim. Tr., p. 46, L. 23 - p. 48, L. 1 O; p. 56, 
Ls. 5-15.) The other bedroom doors were open. (Prelim. Tr., p. 48, L. 22- p. 49, 
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L. 2.) Officers found the wanted feion hiding under a sink in the master 
bathroom. (Tr., p. 12, Ls. 13-17; Prelim. Tr., p. 51, Ls. 3-22; p. 64, Ls. 7-16.) He 
had recently showered in the master bathroom and had his clothes, keys and 
other items in the master bedroom and was getting dressed in the master 
bedroom when the police arrived. (Prelim. Tr., p. 69, Ls. 9-17.) 
During the course of the probation interview and search Diagneau's 
girlfriend and her female friend from California asked to use the bathroom and, 
when granted permission, both used the master bathroom. (Tr., p. 16, L. 2 - p. 
17, L. 11.) The only hygiene products in the house were also located exclusively 
in the master bathroom. (Tr., p. 15, L. 1 - p. 16, L. 1.) 
Probation officers found hypodermic needles and other paraphernalia in 
the master bedroom. (Tr., p. 12, Ls. 18-24; p. 30, Ls. 17-21; Prelim. Tr., p. 56, L. 
16 - p. 58, L. 14.) Diagneau informed the officers that he had moved out of the 
back bedroom and it was no longer his. (Tr., p. 13, Ls. 1-8.) At that point officers 
stopped the search and went to apply for a search warrant. (Id.) Thereafter the 
state applied for, and obtained, a search warrant for the residence. (R., pp. 15-
26.) 
The district court suppressed the evidence found pursuant to the search 
warrant on two bases. (R., pp. 120-130.) First, it concluded that the initial 
search was improper because it "began prior to Mr. Diagneau being informed of 
the search and at no point was a reasonable request made to conduct the 
search." (R., p. 125.) It then found no apparent or actual authority for 
Diagneau's consent because the evidence the state presented regarding 
3 
authority had been discovered in the course of the search itself. (R., pp. 127, 
129.) The state timely appealed. (R., pp. 142-45, 147-53.) 
4 
ISSUES 
1. Did the district court err when it concluded that the initial search was not 
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment as a valid probation search? 
2. Did the district court err when it concluded it should not consider evidence 
gathered from the initial search to determine whether there was authority 
for the probationer to consent to the search? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
The District Court Erred When It Concluded That The Initial Search Was Not 
Reasonable Under The Fourth Amendment As A Valid Probation Search 
A. Introduction 
The district court, ostensibly applying State v. Turek, 150 Idaho 745, 250 
P.3d 796 (Ct. App. 2011 ), held that the search was invalid because it "began 
prior to Mr. Diagneau being informed of the search and at no point was a 
reasonable request made to conduct the search." (R., pp. 123-25.) The court's 
analysis is error for two reasons. First, the Turek analysis applies to 
suspicionless searches; probation searches supported by reasonable suspicion 
such as in this case are constitutionally reasonable without any probation waiver 
whatsoever. Because the officers had suspicion Diagneau was in violation of his 
probation the search was constitutionally reasonable and the scope of his Fourth 
Amendment waiver was entirely irrelevant. Second, even if reviewed under the 
auspices of the probationary waiver, because officers informed Diagneau of their 
purpose they complied with the terms of Diagneau's waiver under the holding in 
Turek. 
--
B. Standard Of Review 
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a 
decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the 
trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but freely 
reviews the application of constitutional principles to those facts. State v. 
Klinqler, 143 Idaho 494, 496, 148 P.3d 1240, 1242 (2006). 
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C. The Probation Search Was Justified By Reasonable Suspicion The 
Probationer Was In Violation Of His Probation 
Parolees and probationers enjoy a reduced expectation of privacy against 
governmental intrusion. Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 (2006); United 
States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (2001). Thus, a probationer is subject to 
warrantless searches by a probation officer if that probation officer has 
reasonable suspicion the probationer has violated probation. Knights, 534 U.S. 
at 121-22; State v. Anderson, 140 Idaho 484, 487-88, 95 P.3d 635, 638-39 
(2004) (defendant released on own recognizance after conviction but before 
sentencing is subject to search upon reasonable suspicion); State v. Adams, 146 
Idaho 162, 164, 191 P.3d 240, 242 (Ct. App. 2008) (probation searches based on 
suspicion are reasonable "[e]ven in the absence of a warrantless search 
condition"). 
In State v. Klingler, 143 Idaho 494, 496-98, 148 P.3d 1240, 1242-44 
(2006), this Court upheld the search of a probationer based on reasonable 
suspicion even though there was no Fourth Amendment waiver applicable at the 
time of the search. In Turek, the case relied upon by the district court, the Idaho 
Court of Appeals recognized that "well-developed law in this area establishes 
that probation searches may be conducted without consent when the officers are 
there to investigate reasonable suspicion of violation of probation terms." State 
v. Turek, 150 Idaho 745, 748, 250 P.3d 796, 799 (Ct. App. 2011) (citing Klingler 
and distinguishing State v. Pinson, 104 Idaho 227, 657 P.2d 1095 (Ct. App. 
1983), in which a probation search based on reasonable suspicion was upheld 
where there was no consent to search as a condition of probation). 
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Here the probation officer had reasonable suspicion that Diagneau was in 
violation of his probation because he was using controlled substances. Thus, 
whether the Fourth Amendment waiver Diagneau executed as part of his 
probation justified the search is irrelevant to this case. Because the probation 
search was justified by reasonable suspicion it was constitutionally proper. The 
district court erred by holding otherwise. 
D. The Search Was Within The Scope Of The Fourth Amendment Waiver 
Even if the district court's analysis were relevant, it is still in error. In 
Turek, the similarly worded probation condition "require[d] that the probationer be 
informed of an officer's intent to conduct an impending search." Turek, 150 
Idaho at 752, 250 P.3d at 803. Here Diagneau was informed of the purpose of 
the police and probation presence in his home upon his initial contact. (Prelim. 
Tr., p. 39, Ls. 12-15 (Lieutenant Wardle told Diagneau the reason the police and 
probation officers were there upon contacting him just after entry); Prelim. Tr., p. 
30, Ls. 5-12 (probation officer Prewitt informed Diagneau of purposes of visit 
upon contacting him); see also R., p. 107 (affidavit of officer Prewitt).) Under the 
holding of Turek this search was properly within the scope of the probation 
Fourth Amendment waiver. 
To the extent the district court found that the probationary search for 
contraband preceded the providing of notice the district court is in both legal and 
clear factual error. In its factual findings the court stated, "Ms. Prewitt began a 
discussion with Mr. Diagneau while police officers were searching all rooms of 
the home." (R., p. 122.) In its analysis the court stated, "The police officers 
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continued searching the other rooms of the residence while Ms. Prewitt entered 
and began informing Mr. Diagneau of the search and its purpose." (R., p. 124.) 
This was legal error because the district court failed to recognize the difference 
between a protective sweep and a probationary search for contraband. lt was 
clear factual error because the evidence presented shows that the officers 
notified Diagneau of the search upon their first contact with him, which preceded 
the search, and because it was the probation officers, not police, who conducted 
the search for contraband and that search occurred after Diagneau had been 
twice informed that he was being subjected to a probationary search. 
A protective sweep is justified "when the searching officer possesses a 
reasonable belief based on specific and articulable facts that the area to be 
swept harbors an individual posing a danger to those on the arrest scene." 
Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 337 (1990). Protective sweeps are allowable to 
protect officers conducting a search. State v. Schaffer, 133 Idaho 126, 982 P.2d 
961 (Ct. App. 1999). Here it was entirely reasonable for the police officers to 
enter and secure the residence in anticipation of the probation search because 
there was reason to believe an at-large felon attempting to avoid the police had 
harbored at the residence. Because the police were engaged in a protective 
sweep, and not the probation search, and because no permission to conduct the 
sweep was required, the district court erred as a matter of law when it concluded 
that the actions of the officers constituted the probationary search which could 
only be conducted after notification to the probationer. 
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The court also erred on the facts. The evidence presented showed that 
Lieutenant Wardle entered the house first, made contact with Diagneau, and 
explained the purpose of the police and probation presence. (Prelim. Tr., p. 39, 
Ls. 5-15.) Only after that was done did the probation officers start searching. 
(Prelim. Tr., p. 39, Ls. 16-19.) Likewise, probation officer Prewitt entered the 
home immediately after probation officer Vansant (who conducted the probation 
search that revealed the paraphernalia), made contact with Diagneau and 
informed him of the intent to search, apparently before Vansant started the 
search of the back bedroom. (Prelim. Tr., p. 29, L. 6 - p. 30, L. 12.) In short, 
there is no evidence that the probation search upon which the suppression 
motion was predicated occurred before Diagneau was notified. On the contrary, 
there is clear evidence that notice of probation search was given twice before the 
search was conducted. 
Even if the start of the search had preceded the notice, the search was 
still reasonable. The district court cited no authority for the proposition that the 
exact timing of the notice and the search was constitutionally significant where 
both occurred contemporaneously. The state submits that like a search incident 
to arrest where the search is not invalidated even if it precedes the formal arrest 
but is still contemporaneous, Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 111 (1980); 
State v. Gibson, 141 Idaho 277, 282, 108 P.3d 424, 429 (Ct. App. 2005); State v. 
Johnson, 137 Idaho 656, 662, 51 P.3d 1112, 1118 (Ct. App. 2002); State v. 
Schwarz, 133 Idaho 463, 468, 988 P.2d 689, 694 (1999), the timing of the notice 
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relative to the search did not render the probationary search constitutionally 
unreasonable because they were contemporaneous. 
To the extent the district court concluded that the lack of a "request" is 
fatal, the court also erred. The holding in Turek was "that a probation condition 
that requires a probationer to submit to a search 'at the request of' an officer 
requires that the probationer be informed of an officer's intent to conduct an 
impending search." 150 Idaho at 753, 250 P.3d at 804 (emphasis added). This 
was not a game of Jeopardy; failure to present the notice in the form of a 
question did not render it unreasonable. 
Finally, if the district court concluded that the request was not 
"reasonable," it erred. The evidence established very good reasons for the 
probationary search-namely that the evidence suggested Diagneau was using 
controlled substances in violation of the terms of his probation. Although the 
state does not believe the court actually found the search unreasonable in this 
sense, it did include the lack of a reasonable request in its analysis. (R., p. 125.) 
If the court was concluding the request was unreasonable it erred. 
The actions of the probation officers and police officers in this case were 
in full compliance with the Fourth Amendment requirements articulated by the 
court of appeals in Turek. Diagneau was twice provided notice of the intent to 
conduct a probationary search. That the police conducted a protective sweep to 
secure the premises and that the notice was not framed as a question did not 
render the probation search constitutionally unreasonable. 
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11. 
The District Court Erred When It Concluded It Could Not Consider Evidence 
Gathered From The Initial Search To Determine Whether There Was Authority 
For The Probationer To Consent To The Search 
A. Introduction 
The district court determined that because the evidence relied on by the 
state to show actual authority was acquired during the course of the search and 
was not known to the state prior to the search the state had failed to show actual 
authority.2 (R., pp. 127-29.) To the extent the district court was holding that the 
state obtained such evidence through an improper search, such was erroneous 
as explained above. To the extent the district court was holding that the state 
may support its claim of actual authority only with evidence within its knowledge 
prior to the search, such is directly contrary to law.3 
2 In so ruling the district court relied on the Idaho Court of Appeal's holding in 
State v. Hansen, 2010 WL 2773331, Docket No. 35519 (Idaho App., July 15, 
2010), wherein the Idaho Court of Appeals found insufficient evidence to show 
that the parolee living on Hansen's property had authority to consent to a 
probation search of the bathroom. The state notes that this holding was reversed 
by the Idaho Supreme Court after the district court issued its order. State v. 
Hansen, 151 Idaho 342, 256 P.3d 750 (2011 ). 
3 Although its conclusion was that the state failed to show that it was aware of the 
communal nature of the bathroom by evidence it acquired before the search, the 
district court also mentioned that some of the facts did not necessarily show that 
the bathroom was communal. (R., pp. 127-28.) It is the state's position that this 
did not constitute an alternative holding. To the extent it might be considered 
such the court erred. The totality of the facts shows communal use of the 
bathroom. Such facts include that the only toiletries in the house were in that 
bathroom and Diagneau's girlfriend and her friend visiting from California clearly 
used the master bathroom as their primary bathroom. In addition, the only 
reason the door to the master bedroom was closed (a fact cited by the district 
court) was that Bean, the wanted felon, who was using the master bathroom to 
shower, closed it as soon as he heard the police enter. 
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B. Standard Of Review 
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a 
decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the 
trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but freely 
reviews the application of constitutional principles to those facts. State v. 
Klingler, 143 Idaho 494,496, 148 P.3d 1240, 1242 (2006). 
C. The State May Support Its Claim Of Actual Authority With Evidence Found 
In The Course Of The Search 
Voluntary consent to enter or search premises from a person with 
authority to consent vitiates the need for a warrant.4 State v. Brauch, 133 Idaho 
215, 219, 984 P.2d 703, 707 (1999) (citing United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 
164, 170 (1974)). Actual authority to consent to a search arises from "mutual use 
of the property by persons generally having joint access or control for most 
purposes, as in the case of married couples or joint tenants." State v. Brauch, 
133 Idaho 215, 219, 984 P.2d 703, 707 (1999) (internal quotation omitted). 
Under this joint access and mutual use rationale, a third party probationer who, 
as a condition of probation waives his Fourth Amendment rights and consents to 
searches, may validly consent to a warrantless search of a residence if he has 
actual authority over it, even if it is shared by others. See State v. Misner, 135 
4 As more fully set forth above, the police conducted a protective sweep of the 
house, including the master bedroom and bathroom. The scope of the probation 
consent did not limit the scope of the protective sweep. State v. Schaffer, 133 
Idaho 126, 982 P.2d 961 (Ct. App. 1999). Thus, the court erred in suppressing 
any evidence related to the harboring charge because such evidence was 
discovered by the police in the course of the protective sweep. 
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Idaho 277, 16 P.3d 953 (Ct. App. 2000). To determine whether a party had 
actual authority to consent to a search, a court may rely on evidence discovered 
during the challenged search. State v. Buhler, 137 Idaho 685, 689-90, 52 P.3d 
329, 333-34 (Ct. App. 2002). 
In the portion of its opinion addressing actual authority the district court 
stated that observations that the master bathroom was communal and accessed 
only through the master bedroom "were made after the initial search of the 
residence" and such evidence was unknown "prior to the search." (R., p.127.) 
The district court concluded that "the State was not aware of the possible 
communal nature of the master bathroom prior to conducting the search." (R., 
pp. 127-28.) Because the district court required the state to prove actual 
authority by evidence known to it before the search and did not consider the 
evidence found as a result of the search, it erred as a matter of law. Reversal 
and remand for consideration of this evidence is appropriate. 
14 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to reverse the district court's 
determination that the probation search was invalid, and to vacate the district 
court's conclusion that the probationer lacked authority to consent to a search of 
the entire house and remand for application of the correct legal standards to that 
question. 
DATED this 26th day of October, 2011. 
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Deputy Attorney Gtner~ 
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